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Abstract
We prove that in competitive market economies with no insurance for idio-
syncratic risks, agents will always overinvest in illiquid long term assets and un-
derinvest in short term liquid assets. We take as our setting the seminal model
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), who first posed the question in a tractable
model. We reach such a simple conclusion under mild conditions because we
stick to the basic competitive market framework, avoiding the banks and inter-
mediaries that Diamond and Dybvig and others introduced.
Keywords: liquidity, constrained ineffi ciency, Diamond-Dybvig models,
fire sales
JEL Classification: E44, D5, E43, E6, G18
∗Email: john.geanakoplos@yale.edu
†Email: walshk@darden.virginia.edu
‡This paper grew from discussions in the Reading Group on Financial Markets and Macroeco-
nomic Fragility at Yale University. We thank all participants. Thank you especially to Alexis Akira
Toda for providing us with very useful and detailed comments.
1
1 Introduction
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 stated that its goal was “to restore
liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States.”To this end, the
act originally gave the Treasury authority to purchase up to $700 billion in illiquid
“troubled assets.”Indeed, it now seems clear that before the late 2000s crisis, financial
institutions systematically overinvested in illiquid assets and underinvested in safe,
liquid assets. Should this pattern surprise us? In general, do agents in competitive
markets systematically choose to provide too little liquidity?
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide the seminal analysis on the tradeoff between
safe, short term assets and higher yielding, long term assets that may be illiquid in the
short run. The tension is that while investors want high average returns, they may
experience liquidity shocks and require cash before the maturity of their long term
investments. With access to a suffi ciently rich set of assets, competitive equilibrium in
such economies is effi cient, and investors achieve optimal liquidity insurance. However,
as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) observe, this set of assets would need to contain
derivatives that condition payments on the needs of individual investors. As liquidity
needs often are private information or diffi cult to observe, competitive asset markets
of this kind will likely be limited.
The basic Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework consists of three periods and
two technologies, a high yielding one that takes two periods to mature and a one
period storage technology that is “liquid”in the sense that in the middle period its
resources are available to consume. In the first period, the ex ante identical agents
divide their resources between the two technologies. In the second period, agents
may consume and trade bonds, but they cannot liquidate long term investments. In
the third period, returns are realized, and the agents consume. Uncertainty and the
need for insurance stem from the fact that in the second period agents face random
liquidity shocks. In particular, agents randomly differ in how they discount future
utility; that is, they differ in impatience. The sudden impatience represents, for
example, the possibility that an investor might experience a random medical problem
or that a financial firm might have to honor a credit default swap. We extend this
idiosyncratic risk to allow for aggregate risk: both the fraction of the population at
each impatience level and the long term return are stochastic. Consequently, the
interest rate that emerges in the middle period is also stochastic.
At this point in their analysis, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) took a sharp turn.
They moved away from competitive and anonymous markets and introduced banks
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and financial intermediaries. Their paper shows that such institutions may improve
upon stark incomplete markets by offering incentive compatible contracts to investors.
In the original Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, a standard bank deposit contract
is incentive compatible and suffi cient for optimal insurance, even when liquidity needs
are private information. The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) analysis is famous for a
nasty side effect of bank deposit contracts: their model exhibits multiple equilibria.
While one equilibrium yields optimal insurance, the other consists of a bank run,
which is worse than autarky. So, in overcoming the private information problem, the
market becomes fundamentally fragile.
While most related papers follow Diamond and Dybvig’s lead and study bank runs
or intermediary contracting problems, we return to the simpler Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) setting consisting of just individual investors and competitive asset markets.
We answer our original question by showing that in our Diamond and Dybvig setting,
agents always underinvest in short term, liquid assets.
We require two mild assumptions: (1) Absolute risk aversion is nonincreasing. (2)
Ex ante, investors place more weight on their future impatient selves than on their
future patient selves. Almost all commonly used utility functions satisfy (1); Arrow
(1965) wrote that violations of decreasing absolute risk aversion are problematic.
Assumption (2) is simply the embodiment of liquidity shocks being emergencies, which
are associated with high marginal utility, all else equal.
Our main result (Theorem 1) is that under (1) and (2), all incomplete markets
competitive equilibria are constrained ineffi cient: agents overinvest in the illiquid, long
term technology. The investors would all be better off ex ante if they each decided to
shift some resources from the longer illiquid investment to the liquid investment. That
welfare rises is surprising: weighting their impatient selves more, that is, realizing
liquidity shocks are emergencies, the investors were already allocating extra to the
short term technology as insurance against liquidity shocks. However, in equilibrium,
they do not allocate enough.
A pecuniary externality is at play. When every individual shifts resources from
long term to short term they depress the middle period interest rates, reallocating
resources from middle period lenders (individuals who turned out to be patient) to
borrowers (individuals who turned out to be impatient). When an individual shifts
his own resources from long term to short term, he is shifting money from the last
period to the middle period whether or not he turns out to be impatient.1
1We prove in Theorem 1 that the over investment stems from the argument in the last paragraph,
that when impatience is caused by emergencies, the utility from impatient selves is weighted more
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A key step in deriving the ineffi ciency of competitive investment is proving that
the interest rate between the last two periods falls when agents get richer in the
penultimate period and poorer in the final period. To sign this static, it suffi ces to
show that the resulting two period economies always display stability, so we are able
to employ the results of Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016), who show that in two good,
I agent economies with common Bernoulli utilities and common endowments but
arbitrary heterogeneous discounts, nonincreasing absolute risk aversion guarantees
stability.
Our analysis contributes to the existing literature on liquidity provision in three
main ways. First, most papers following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) study the inter-
mediary contracting problem, the interaction of intermediaries, or security design. We
show that the welfare and policy results of this literature arise in a simple competitive
equilibrium setting. We suggest that the main implications and lessons stem simply
from market incompleteness, and not from private information mechanism design.
Second, we employ weaker assumptions in proving overinvestment in the long term
technology. While our main assumption is nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, pre-
vious authors impose some combination of CRRA u, homothetic u, numerical bounds
on relative risk aversion, and bounds on the long term return. Third, unlike previous
studies, we allow for aggregate risk in the fraction of the population that turns out
to be impatient (as well as in the long term return), which makes the interest rate
random.
The paper concludes with an extension in which the investors may in the middle
period liquidate the long term technology. In states where the fraction of impatient
agents is particularly high, the long term return is low, or the liquidation return is
high, the interest rate rises to a level that induces the agents to liquidate part of the
long term technology. This fire sale of productive assets is a tangible manifestation
of underinvestment in the short term technology. Theorem 2 shows that the fire sale
economy also exhibits constrained ineffi cient liquidity underprovision. In a numer-
ical example, forcing agents to provide more liquidity initially and thus to curtail
investment in the more productive long term asset actually increases total produc-
tion in crisis states of the world: fire sales decline at a rate faster than the increase
than the utility from patient selves. We prove in Theorem 3 that if the patient selves are weighted
suffi ciently more than the impatient selves, then there is under investment in all equilibria. Finally,
in Theorem 4 we prove that when there is no aggregate risk about the fraction of the population that
turns out to be impatient, then equilibrium is unique, and for almost all ex ante weights individuals
place on their future patient and impatient selves, equilibrium is constrained ineffi cient: everybody




Economists have long discussed the tension financial institutions face in deciding
between safe, liquid reserves and more profitable but illiquid long term investments.
In their Yale College economics textbook, Fairchild, Furniss, and Buck (1937) write,
“The banker is impelled by two counteracting motives, profits and safety.
The bank derives its profits principally from the making of loans and dis-
counts, and the larger its portfolio of loans and discounts the larger in
general will its profits be. But as loans and discounts are made, cash is
immediately withdrawn or deposits are created or the bank’s note issues
are increased. Thus the reserve ratio falls, and the bank’s condition be-
comes proportionately less safe. To the banker’s desire for profits is thus
opposed the necessity of keeping a safe ratio between the reserve and the
demand liabilities.”(page 439)
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide the most famous mathematical treatment of
this topic. They observe, as do we, that standard competitive markets will be inef-
ficient without state contingent assets. However, rather than addressing constrained
effi ciency or possible beneficial market interventions, these authors analyze the ability
of bank deposit contracts to insure investors and famously observe that such inter-
mediary contracts introduce the possibility of a bank run equilibrium, which is worse
than autarky.
Also, the original Diamond-Dybvig preference structure is quite particular. They
assume that impatient types have the utility function u (c1) and that patient types
have the utility function u (c1 + c2), where c1 and c2 are first and second period
consumption. We suppose that both types have the utility function u (c1) + βu (c2),
where β is lower for the impatient agents. Furthermore, unlike Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), we require neither a quantitative bound on relative risk aversion nor a cross-
restriction on the long term asset return and the size of the preference shock.
Jacklin (1987) extends Diamond and Dybvig (1983) along two dimensions. First,
he considers both the original Diamond-Dybvig preferences and a preference specifi-
cation similar to the one we employ. Second, he compares the risk sharing properties
2Of course in low interest rate states, the curtailment of long term investments reduces production.
Ex ante expected production also may fall. But as our theorems show, expected utility increases for
everyone when illiquid investment is curtailed a little.
5
of standard bank deposit contracts with those of an economy in which agents trade
equity shares in a firm that makes the initial long run/short run portfolio decision.
When agents cannot trade bank deposits, deposit contracts welfare dominate allo-
cations from competitive equity markets because second-best insurance calls for a
wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the technological rate of return.
With competitive, laissez-faire asset markets, investor trade erodes such wedges. In-
deed, when agents can retrade bank deposits, allocations from the two mechanisms
coincide. For this reason, Jacklin’s (1987) policy suggestion is the “prohibition of a
frictionless credit market,”in the presence of an existing bank deposit arrangement.
Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) effectively argue, however, that the char-
acterization of Jacklin (1987) is too stark. In their model, intermediaries compete
to design liquidity insurance mechanisms for investors. The catch is that the result-
ing contracts are non-exclusive in the sense that the intermediaries cannot stop their
customers from trading bonds amongst themselves. With more preference general-
ity than in Jacklin (1987), these authors order by welfare a taxonomy of insurance
arrangements. First-best (SP1) allocations maximize ex ante utility subject to re-
source constraints. Second-best (SP2) allocations honor both resource and incentive
compatibility constraints. With the original Diamond-Dybvig preferences, SP1 and
SP2 coincide. When profit maximizing intermediaries compete to insure the agents,
Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) refer to the situation as CE2. As competition
drives profits to zero, CE2 coincides with SP2. That is, subject to the private infor-
mation constraint, the government cannot improve on competitive insurance markets.
CE3 arises when price-taking intermediaries compete and investors can privately trade
in competitive bond markets. The observation of Jacklin (1987) is basically that CE3
is worse than SP2 (and CE2) and that preventing private retrading improves welfare.
Market forces are effectively an additional constraint.
In contrast, Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) show that CE3 is ineffi cient
beyond its distinction from CE2. Specifically, they characterize the third-best (SP3),
in which the planner maximizes utility subject to resource constraints, incentive con-
straints (regarding liquidity preferences), and constraints that prevent investor side
trades at the corresponding market prices. SP3 is worse than SP2 because it entails
more constraints. SP3 is, however, better than CE3 because unlike the price-taking
intermediaries, the planner understands how his contracts affect the private market
interest rate. In short, the allocations of CE3 suffer due to a pecuniary externality.
The key theorem of Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) explains how simple liquid-
ity controls on intermediaries drive the economy from CE3 to SP3. They show that
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if the impatient agents have, all else equal, more (less) ex ante utility weight, then
CE3 underprovides (overprovides) liquidity. However, to sign the link between initial
investment and ex ante utility in any case, the authors require either preference ho-
motheticity or a bound on the liquidity shock variance. Thus, our analysis is distinct
both in that we study the case without intermediaries and require just nonincreasing
absolute risk aversion.
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) study a related setting in which intermediaries
insure agents who want to consume either early or late. However, at the time of
initial investment, each intermediary is uncertain about the fraction of “early diers”
he will face and wants to insure against having too many of them. Consequently,
the model of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) is mathematically similar to the general
Diamond-Dybvig setting but has intermediaries instead of individual investors as
its agents. In the parlance of Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009), the focus of
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) is a characterization of SP2. In particular, they show
how different assumptions regarding preferences affect the sign of the optimal wedge
between the technological return and the effective interest rate. Also, they observe
that Walrasian interbank markets exhibit “free-rider” problems, but they do not
formalize this argument.
Finally, using the original Diamond-Dybvig preferences, Yared (2013) also consid-
ers a case without intermediaries. In his model, agents cannot commit to honoring
debt contracts, but the government can issue bonds for trade (financed by taxes).
When the government issues a suffi cient number of bonds, the economy is equivalent
to one with unconstrained, uncontingent trade between agents. In this case, the equi-
librium allocations are ineffi cient. However, by restricting the supply of bonds, the
government effectively imposes a t = 1 borrowing constraint and under certain condi-
tions can implement the first-best. The borrowing constraint helps because it forces
agents to store more initially. So, Yared (2013) also derives an overinvestment result.
Our analysis is distinct from his because (i) he uses the original Diamond-Dybvig
preference/shock assumptions, (ii) his policy intervention involves using fiscal policy
to set a borrowing constraint in the middle period of the model, and (iii) he does not
allow for aggregate risk.3
3See also Allen and Gale (2004) and Grochulski and Zhang (2016).
7
3 Model
Consider an economy consisting of three time periods, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and a unit mass
of ex ante identical investors. There is a single consumption good in each time period,
and each agent is endowed with e > 0 units of the good at t = 0. At t = 0, each
agent allocates his endowment between two investment technologies. The first is a
one period saving technology that yields a gross return of 1 at t = 1. The second
is a long term illiquid investment that gives a gross return of Rs > 0 at t = 2 in
aggregate state s ∈ S, where S ≥ 1. Let x and y denote the respective allocations to
the short and long term assets. Let es1 (x) and es2 (x) denote the t = 1 and t = 2
endowments conditional on liquid investment x in state s. By definition, es1 (x) = x
and es2 (x) = Rs (e− x) = Rsy.4 At t = 1, the agents trade one period, riskless bonds
in competitive, anonymous markets.
While investors do not consume at t = 0, they derive utility from consumption at
t = 1 and t = 2 according to the twice continuously differentiable Bernoulli utility
function u, which satisfies u′ > 0 , u′′ < 0, and limx↓0 u′ (x) = ∞. At t = 0, the
agents face two forms of uncertainty. First, agents randomly have different tastes for
consumption at t = 1 and t = 2. That is, they have different degrees of impatience,
and each investor learns his type at t = 1. Second, there is aggregate risk concerning
the probability distribution of types and the t = 2 return. As the t = 1 interest rate
depends on the distribution of types, this uncertainty introduces interest rate risk.
Suppose there are I > 1 impatience types indexed by i. Type i is distinguished
by the pair (wi, βi)  0. We suppose the state s, t = 1 present value utility of












where cist is the consumption of type i at t ∈ {1, 2} in state s ∈ S. Parameter
βi represents the patience of type i. If βi < βj, then i is more impatient than j.
Parameter wi weights the utility of different types. If in addition to βi < βj we
also have wiβi ≥ wjβj, then ex ante type i is valued more than type j, because the
present value weights are higher for i in period 1 and at least as high in period 2. We
suppose that impatience increases because of emergencies, which increase the utility
of contemporaneous consumption. The case with wiβi = wjβj corresponds to the one
4Since e is arbitrary and completely invested in the two assets (there is no t = 0 consumption), it
is without loss of generality to fix the short term return at 1. If the short term return were R0 > 0,
then the t = 0 tradeoff would be between a t = 1 return of R0 or a t = 2 return of Rs. This is
equivalent to letting the initial endowment be ẽ = R0e and setting the t = 1 and t = 2 returns to 1
and Rs/R0, respectively.
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described in footnote 5 of independent and equally likely emergencies each period.5
There are S possible type distributions: Π1, ...,ΠS, where Πs =
(





πis is the probability of becoming type i conditional on distribution s. Let Ps > 0
be the t = 0 probability of realizing distribution s at t = 1. Assume, as usual, that
πis is both the probability of becoming type i as well as the fraction of agents that
realize type i. By relabeling the impatience types as necessary, it is without loss of
generality to order the agents as follows: β1 < ... < βI .
Let qs be the t = 1 price of a bond paying 1 at t = 2. As the agents are the same
ex ante, they choose the same x at t = 0 and thus have identical endowments at t = 1
and t = 2. However, because they differ in impatience, they trade in bonds at t = 1.
The type distribution determines the gains from trade and thus the market clearing
interest rate. Hence, the bond price has an s subscript. Define q ≡ (q1, ..., qS). Let
bis denote the bond holdings of type i conditional on state s. The t = 0 budget set of
an agent is thus
B̃ (q, e) =

(








∈ R2+ × R3SI | ∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S
x+ y ≤ e,
cis1 + qsb
i





Note that because there are no bond market frictions, it is without loss of generality
5Our analysis would be the same even if emergencies were equally likely to come in period 1 or
period 2. Suppose that every agent has probability p of facing an emergency in the middle period
and the same probability p of facing an emergency in the last period. These risks are indepedent
across periods and across agents. Suppose that in case of an emergency, the Bernoulli utility of
consumption is multiplied by λ > 1. Let λ̄ = pλ+ (1− p)1.
Let ct be consumption in period t if there is no emergency in period t, and let ctE be consumption
in period t if there is an emergency in period t. Since there are no insurance markets, conditional
on what happens in the middle period, agents will consume the same amount c2 = c2E whether or
not they face an emergency in the last period. Conditional on being in an emergency in period 1,
an agent will be maximizing
λu(c1E) + βλ̄u(c2).
Conditional on not being in an emergency in period 1, an agent will be maximizing
u(c1) + βλ̄u(ĉ2)
The upshot is that an agent who faces an emergency in period 1 acts as if he is more impatient
than an agent who does not face an emergency in period 1. Just as importantly, assuming that ex
ante agents maximize the expectation of these utilities, one can see that more weight is put on the
impatient self than the patient self in the sense that the period 1 utility of the impatient (emergency)
self is weighted more than the period 1 utility of the patient (nonemergency) self, and the expected
period 2 utility (of the period 1 emergency self) is weighted at least as much as the expected period
2 utility of the nonemergency period 1 self.
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to assume that the agents simultaneously trade t = 1 and t = 2 consumption goods
at respective prices 1 and qs. Conditional on (x, y) and aggregate state s, the set-
ting becomes a classic I agent, two good endowment economy. We can ignore bond
holdings and write the budget set as
B (q, e) =

(






∈ R2+ × R2SI+ | ∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S
x+ y ≤ e,
cis1 + qsc
i
s2 ≤ x+ qsRsy
 .






























∈ B (q, e) .
Given e, define cist (x, qs) to be time t consumption demand at bond price qs and
endowment (x,Rs (e− x)). We now define competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) Competitive equilibrium consists of
prices q∗s (∀s ∈ S), a short term asset investment x∗ (liquidity), and consumption
choices ci∗st = c
i
st (x
∗, q∗s) (∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S, t ∈ {1, 2}) such that:
1. Given prices,
(




solves the t = 0 investor problem (1).











s2 = Rs (e− x∗) .
From the assumptions on u, competitive equilibrium exists, and in equilibrium
there is an interior solution for liquidity:
Proposition 1 (Existence) A competitive equilibrium exists and x∗ ∈ (0, e).
Proposition 1 stems from the following observation: as x approaches 0, the in-
terest rate diverges to infinity in all states, encouraging high investment in x. As x
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approaches e, the gross interest rate goes to 0, encouraging high investment in y. By
continuity, there is an intermediate x that constitutes an equilibrium.6
Note that Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assume there are two types and that patient
and impatient utility are, respectively, ρu (c1 + c2) and u (c1), where ρ < 1, ρR > 1,
and relative risk aversion is greater than or equal to 1. While our specification is
not technically a generalization of the classical Diamond and Dybvig (1983) one, our
general setting exhibits the same tensions and tradeoffs as those of the classical model.
Moreover, our version is the standard representation of time variation in “taste”for
consumption. In the classical setting, patient and impatient agents have qualitatively
different preferences: while for the former c1 and c2 are perfect substitutes, for the
latter t = 2 goods are completely useless. In contrast, we follow Jacklin (1987),
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), and Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) and analyze
the case in which t = 1 and t = 2 goods are imperfect substitutes for both types.
4 Welfare Analysis
As there are not complete t = 0 insurance markets for emergency risk, competitive
equilibrium is not ex ante Pareto effi cient. In this section, we show that equilibrium
is also constrained ineffi cient (Theorem 1): decreasing absolute risk aversion implies
investors systematically underinvest in liquidity.
Once agents have chosen their initial investment x, the economy reduces to a
simple collection of S two period economies. Observe that after each agent chooses
x, his budget set in each state s if he is of impatience type i reduces to






∈ R2+| cis1 + qscis2 ≤ x+ qsRs (e− x)
}
.
We now define competitive equilibrium conditional on x:
Definition 2 (Competitive Equilibrium Conditional on x) Competitive
equilibrium conditional on x consists of prices qs (x) (∀s ∈ S) and consumption
choices cist (x) = c
i
st (x, qs (x)) (∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S, t ∈ {1, 2}) such that:
1. Given qs (x), we have (cis1 (x) , c
i




















6Given x ∈ (0, e), the model reduces to a collection of two good, I agent economies in which
existence and continuity follow from standard arguments.
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s2 (x) = Rs (e− x) .
Given arbitrary bond prices q and liquidity x, we can define ex ante utility V (x,q):


























∈ B (qs, e, x, s) .
Therefore, conditional on x equilibrium ex ante utility is V (x,q (x)), and competitive
equilibrium ex ante utility is V (x∗,q (x∗)). Consider now the t = 0 problem of a
benevolent planner who is able to force all of the investors into a particular short
term savings level x but then must stand idly by while markets clear. The planner
can anticipate that each agent will wind up with expected utility V (x,q (x)) . As
his policy affects all agents, the planner, unlike the atomistic individuals, internalizes
how x impacts qs across different realizations of Πs. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1986) described a method for proving that generically in these types of situations
with incomplete markets, the planner can improve utility by choosing x that differs
from competitive equilibrium. Here we sharpen that conclusion by proving that the
planner can always improve utility by increasing x beyond competitive equilibrium
x∗.
Define a (·) ≡ −u′′ (·) /u′ (·) to be the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aver-
sion. u satisfies declining absolute risk aversion (DARA) if a (c) ≥ a (c′) whenever
c ≤ c′. We now state our main result.
Theorem 1 Suppose (i) u satisfies DARA and (ii) if βi ≤ βj then wiβi ≥ wjβj.
Then every competitive equilibrium is ex ante constrained ineffi cient. In particular,
all investors could be made better off by collectively allocating more to the short term
asset: the function V : (0, e)× RS++ → R is differentiable, and at every equilibrium,









Condition (ii) says, essentially, that agents put more ex ante weight on their
impatient selves than on their patient selves, which causes them to choose higher x
than if they put equal weight on their future selves. The theorem says that, despite
this, they would all be better off if they all chose still higher x (and thus lower y).
In short, condition (ii) and DARA imply overinvestment in the long term, illiquid
asset. Furthermore, one can show that interest rates are highest exactly when the
fraction of impatient agents is highest. Hence, investors realize that they are most
likely to become impatient exactly when borrowing rates will be highest. These high
rates in impatient times incline them to allocate more to the short investment than
they would have otherwise. But, as Theorem 1 tells us, the investors do not allocate
enough to the short term asset: no one agent affects the interest rate, which is the
tool by which all are made better off collectively.
Intuitively, increasing liquidity above x∗ has two effects. First, by stability the
interest rate falls (the price of t = 2 goods rises) as the relative supply of t = 1
goods rises. For all realizations of s, the falling rate redistributes from the lenders
(the patient agents) to the borrowers (the impatient agents). As there is more utility
weight on the impatient agents, ex ante utility increases (as does ex post utility, on
average). The second effect is that each agent’s t = 1 (t = 2) endowment rises (falls).
In states where the interest rate is high, this effect actually benefits all agents, holding
constant the price. When the interest rate is low, everyone is hurt. The question is,
what is the overall balance of these endowment effects? Can they overwhelm the
beneficial redistribution effect? The answer is no. As we see in the Date 0 Lemma,
this balancing is exactly the margin on which each agent is choosing x to begin
with. At x∗, these endowment effects completely wash out. Only the redistribution
effect remains, which means increasing liquidity (local to x∗) unambiguously improves
utility ex ante.
A key step in proving Theorem 1 is establishing stability of equilibrium, which
follows from the results of Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016). They show that utility sep-
arability, DARA, common endowments, and common Bernoulli utilities are suffi cient
for uniqueness and stability in two good, I agent economies, which are what emerge
in the present analysis after x is chosen and uncertainty is resolved. The key step in
proving stability is in establishing that total demand for t = 2 goods is downward
sloping in q for any x and realization of s. Why is DARA suffi cient for downward
sloping demand? Proving suffi ciency amounts to showing that the income effects of
relatively impatient agents are not too strong. Patient agents, who are savers, neces-
sarily have downward sloping demand: the substitution effect in the Slutsky equation
13
is negative by separability and concavity, and the income effect term is negative be-
cause they are buyers of t = 2 goods. For very impatient agents, however, the income
effect may be positive because the most impatient agents are borrowing (they are
sellers of t = 2 goods). DARA is suffi cient for showing that the total income effect
is negative. Specifically, this assumption ensures that the patient agents have the
largest (absolute value) income effects. Why? The most patient agents consume the
most t = 2 goods. If a (c) ≥ a (c′) whenever c ≤ c′, these agents have the least
sensitive marginal utility of consumption for these goods. If you give an investor a
splash of income, he allocates between t = 1 and t = 2 goods, keeping constant the
ratio of marginal utilities. With highly insensitive marginal utility for t = 2 goods, a
patient agent will change consumption of t = 2 goods a lot just to the maintain the
ratio. See the Appendix and Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016) for more details.
Curtailing short term investment is not always the right intervention. If instead of
condition (ii) we assume w1 ≤ w2 ≤ ... ≤ wN , then there is always underinvestment
in the long term technology, which we prove as Theorem 3 in the Appendix. If the
w’s satisfy Equation 9 in the Appendix, then equilibrium is constrained effi cient. Is
9 a knife-edge case? When S = 1, we can prove the answer is yes: Theorem 4 in the
Appendix considers the classical case of no aggregate risk about the fraction of the
population that turns out to be impatient. We prove that equilibrium is unique, and
for almost all ex ante weights (w1, ..., wI) individuals place on their future patient
and impatient selves, equilibrium is constrained ineffi cient: everybody could be made
better off if everybody shifted investment one way or the other.7
In comparison with the existing literature, our assumption of DARA is weaker than
those employed in previous papers, which impose some combination of CRRA u, ho-
mothetic u, numerical bounds on relative risk aversion, and restrictions on Rs. Some
variation of condition (ii) has been needed in previous papers to establish underinvest-
ment in liquidity. A special case is wi = 1/βi, which implies w1β1 = ... = wIβI = 1.
wi = 1/βi corresponds to the “liquidity shock”case from Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvin-
ski (2009) and is similar to the original Diamond-Dybvig specification. Finally, while
most other papers emphasize the role of banks or intermediaries in creating ineffi cien-
cies, we derive and sign constrained ineffi ciency in a simple setting consisting of just
anonymous trade in competitive asset markets.
7With S > 1, we conjecture Theorem 4 would still hold, but the proof would be more diffi cult.
Theorem 4 does not follow from Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) because in the present paper
we have fixed individual endowments at 0 (all consumption comes from production). Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986) prove constrained ineffi ciency for almost all endowments, not for any fixed
set of individual endowments.
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5 Fire Sales
We now change the model so that agents are able to liquidate the long term investment
at a fire sale rate at t = 1. In particular, after uncertainty is resolved, an agent may
liquidate an amount Lis, where 0 ≤ Lis ≤ y. Doing so yields a fire sale return of
rsL
i
s at t = 1, where rs > 0, and means that the agent’s t = 2 endowment falls to
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s be the total fire sale liquidation. Competitive equilibrium is as in










s2 = Rs (e− x− Ls) . (4)
In contrast with the rs = 0 version in which liquidation is impossible, here a
high interest rate (1/qs) induces t = 1 liquidation, resulting in a decline in t = 2
production. Indeed, if 1/qs > Rs/rs in state s, agents would fully liquidate the long
term technology, consuming at t = 2 only via the bond market. This complete fire
sale, however, could never be an equilibrium because it would violate t = 2 market
clearing (4). Therefore, in state s of the fire sale equilibrium either 1/qs = Rs/rs and
agents are indifferent to liquidation or 1/qs < Rs/rs and Ls = 0. Because agents are
indifferent in fire sale states, is straightforward to extend the proof of Theorem 1 to
the fire sale economy, yielding Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 Suppose (i) u satisfies DARA, (ii) if βi ≤ βj then wiβi ≥ wjβj, and
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(iii) there is at least one state without fire sales (e.g., rs = 0 for some s ∈ S). Then
every competitive equilibrium with fire sales is ex ante constrained ineffi cient. In
particular, all investors could be made strictly better off by collectively allocating
more to the short term asset.
Proof. See Appendix.
5.1 Numerical Fire Sale Example
Consider the special case where there are two types, impatient and patient (ρI > ρP ,
where ρi = 1/βi), and two aggregate states, normal and crisis (πIN < π
I
C). R and r











(.5, .1), (PC , PN) = (.1, .9), and e = 1. In Figure 1, we see that as liquidation recovery
r increases past roughly .8, the agents liquidate part of the long term technology in
the crisis state. And, in anticipation of this option, all else equal, initial liquid short
term investment x declines. The decline in short term liquid investment, coupled
with the fire sale option, generates endogenous volatility in t = 2 production. Note,
however, that the possibility of liquidation actually increases ex ante utility, as we
see in Figure 1: the fire sale caps the interest rate at R/r and effectively improves
insurance.
Figure 2 shows what happens with the imposition of various initial liquidity levels.
Increasing x decreases the interest rate in normal times (Figure 3) and improves
utility, up to a point. Most interestingly, we see that while increasing x mechanically
decreases the t = 2 endowment in normal times, the additional liquidity actually
increases production in crisis times. The reason is that fire sales decline faster than
the fall in long term investment. Therefore, a liquidity floor not only improves welfare
for the investors but also increases output in the worst states of the world.
6 Conclusion
In our generalized version of the seminal Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, incom-
plete but anonymous and competitive markets yield constrained ineffi cient allocations.
Specifically, investors underprovide the market with liquidity: if they were to collec-
tively invest less in long term illiquid assets, they would all achieve better insurance
and higher ex ante utility. We allow for uncertainty in the liquidity shock distribu-
tion and the long term return, which creates aggregate interest rate risk. Our key
assumptions are just that (i) all else equal, investors experiencing liquidity shocks have
16

















Fire Sale (L, Crisis)










t = 2 Endowment (Crisis)





t = 2 Endowment (Normal)
Figure 1: Varying the Liquidation Value (r) in the Fire Sales Model
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t = 2 Endowment (Normal)
Figure 2: Varying the Initial Level of Liquidity (x). The solid blue lines correspond
to the case with r = .9. The dotted blue lines correspond to the case without fire











qC (Solid) and q N (Dotted)









qC (Solid) and q N (Dotted)
Figure 3: Bond Prices, Varying the Liquidation Value (r) and the Initial Level of
Liquidity (x). The black vertical line corresponds to the equilibrium level of liquidity.
r = .9 in the right pane.
higher marginal utility of consumption and (ii) absolute risk aversion is nonincreas-
ing in consumption. An intuitive and common argument is that financial institutions
and investors overinvest in high yielding but illiquid assets. We have shown that this
overinvestment holds across a number of important dimensions of generality.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Geanakoplos andWalsh (2016) Results for the Two Good,
I Agent Economy
This section rehashes the results of Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016), which we use in
proving our Theorems. Consider the economy that exists after liquidity x has been
chosen and all uncertainty has resolved. To simplify notation, drop reference to x and
s. This economy consists of the I impatience types, where πi is the fraction of i types,
and two goods, t = 1 consumption (ci1) and t = 2 consumption (c
i
2). The agents
have the identical endowment (e1, e2)  0. Stars denote competitive equilibrium
quantities. The utility function of impatience type i ∈ I is u (ci1) + βiu (ci2), where u
is twice continuously differentiable, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and limx↓0 u′ (x) =∞. u satisfies
DARA if a (c) ≥ a (c′) whenever c ≤ c′, where a (·) ≡ −u′′ (·) /u′ (·). The agents are
ordered by patience: β1 < ... < βI . The budget constraint is ci1 + qc
i
2 ≤ e1 + qe2.
Define D (q) ≡
I∑
i=1
πici2 ((e1, e2) , q) to be market demand for t = 2 goods, where
ci2 ((e1, e2) , q) is type i’s demand at price q. From Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016), we
have the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose u satisfies DARA. Then equilibrium is unique and the
following hold:
1. c1∗1 > ... > c
I∗
1
2. c1∗2 < ... < c
I∗
2





, where ρi = 1/βi
4. Demand is downward sloping: D′ (q∗) < 0
5. Equilibrium is stable: ∂q∗/∂e1 > 0 and ∂q∗/∂e2 < 0.
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6. q∗ is continuously differentiable in (e1, e2), and cit is continuously differentiable
in (e1, e2) and q.
Proof. Parts 1, 2, 4, and 5 are proved in Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016). Part 3
follows immediately from part 1 and the Euler equations, q = βiu′ (ci2) /u
′ (ci1), which
hold at the optimum by the assumptions on u. The properties in Part 6 are standard,
following from the twice continuous differentiability of u, the Euler equation, market
clearing conditions, and the implicit function theorem.
Intuitively, when absolute risk aversion is decreasing then the derivative of con-
sumption with respect to wealth is increasing in consumption: ∂ci2/∂ω rises monoton-
ically in ci2, meaning buyers have the strongest income effects. It follows that demand
is downward sloping, which implies stability.
8.2 Statement and Proof of the Date 0 Lemma
Date 0 Lemma At competitive equilibrium, the partial derivative of ex ante utility







Proof. Plugging the budget constraint into Equation 2, ex ante utility is































cis1 (x, qs (x))
)
(1− qs (x)Rs) . (5)
































(1− qsRs) . (6)
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By the concavity of the problem and x∗ ∈ (0, e) (see Proposition 1), the FOC holds








8.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Plugging the budget constraint into Equation 2 and optimizing over cis2, ex ante utility
is










u (x+ qs (x)Rs (e− x)− qs (x) cis2 (x, qs (x)))
+βiu (cis2 (x, qs (x)))
)
.
By part 6 of Proposition 2, V : (0, e) × RS++ → R is well defined and differentiable.



























Since x∗ ∈ (0, e) by Proposition 1 and since DARA holds, q′s (x∗) > 0 by stability



















Rs (e− x∗)− ci∗s2
)
, (8)
where ρi = 1/βi. By premise (ii) of the theorem and Proposition 2 (parts 2 and 3),
(wiβiρiu′ (ci∗s1))
i∈I and (Rs (e− x∗)− ci∗s2)
i∈I are both strictly decreasing sequences.
By interpreting type i ∈ I as a random variable drawn with probability πis, these
22
sequences are strictly decreasing functions of the random variable (call them f (i)
and g (i), respectively), and we can write the weighted summation in Equation 8 as







Rs (e− x∗)− ci∗s2
)]
= EΠs [f (i) g (i)] .
Since the functions are strictly decreasing, the Chebyshev Sum Inequality give us
EΠs [f (i) g (i)] > EΠs [f (i)]EΠs [g (i)] .
8
So, the theorem follows from market clearing:





Rs (e− x∗)− ci∗s2
)
= 0.
Intuitively, since wiβiρiu′ (ci∗s1) and Rs (e− x∗) − ci∗s2 have the same order, they have
positive covariance. Since the expectation of Rs (e− x∗)− ci∗s2 is 0 by market clearing,
positive covariance implies the expectation of the product is positive:
0 < covΠs [f (i) , g (i)] = EΠs [f (i) g (i)]− EΠs [f (i)]EΠs [g (i)]
= EΠs [f (i) g (i)] . 
8.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Given two observations, the proof of Theorem 1 can be easily adapted to prove The-
orem 2. First, the Date 0 Lemma still holds with fire sales. To see this, let qs (x)
denote the conditional on x equilibrium price without fire sales, and let q̃s (x) denote
the equilibrium price with fire sales. If 1/qs > Rs/rs, then once fire sales are allowed
agents will choose Lis = e − x. In this case, markets will not clear in t = 2. So, if
1/qs (x) ≥ Rs/rs, then q̃s (x) = rs/Rs and agents are indifferent to the level of Lis.
If 1/qs < Rs/rs, then income is maximized by choosing Lis = 0, and qs (x) = q̃s (x).
From the perspective of the price-taking agents, in equilibrium the economy is as if
there were no fire sales. Therefore, since there is one state without fire sales, we will
8To prove the Chebyshev Sum Inequality, let i be a random variable, and let f and g
be either both increasing or decreasing. If i′ is an i.i.d. copy of i, then we must always
have (f (i)− f (i′)) (g (i)− g (i′)) ≥ 0 for any realization of i, i′. Taking expectation, we get
E [f (i) g (i)]− E [f (i)]E [g (i′)] −E [f (i′)]E [g (i)] + E [f (i′) g (i′)] ≥ 0, which yields the weak ver-
sion of the inequality. When f and g are strictly decreasing and i is non-constant (as in our setting),
the inequality is strict.
23
have x∗ ∈ (0, e) (by the argument for Proposition 1) and the x FOC (6) will hold in
equilibrium.
Second, even though q̃s (x) is non-differentiable at x if 1/qs (x) = Rs/rs, q̃s (x) is
always right differentiable in equilibrium. In states where 1/qs < Rs/rs, Lis = 0 binds
and DARA ensures the interest rate falls as x rises, which only makes Lis = 0 bind
more. If 1/qs > Rs/rs, then the interest rate 1/q̃s (x) is stuck at Rs/rs, even with
a little more liquidity (since qs (x) is continuous). If 1/qs = Rs/rs and agents are
exactly indifferent to using fires or not, then increasing x pushes down the interest
rate and makes them strictly prefer to not liquidate any of the long term asset.
We can now sign the ex ante utility impact of a small increase in x (at x∗) in
the fire sales economy. Holding prices constant, the state by state reallocation of
endowments has no impact on utility by the Date 0 Lemma. In the strict fire sale
states, the interest rate is constant and there is no price effect on utility. In the strict
and indifferent Lis = 0 states (there is at least one by assumption), it is as if there
were no fire sales, and the proof of Theorem 2 goes through. 
8.5 Statement and Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 Suppose (i) u satisfies DARA and (ii) if βi ≤ βj then wi ≤ wj. Then
competitive equilibrium is ex ante constrained ineffi cient. In particular, all investors







Proof. Using βiρi = 1 and the fact that (wiu′ (ci∗s1))
i∈I and (Rs (e− x∗)− ci∗s2)
i∈I are,
respectively, strictly increasing and decreasing (part 1 of Proposition 1 and premise
(ii)), Theorem 3 follows from the proof of Theorem 1.
8.6 Statement and Proof of Theorem 4
From the proofs of Theorems 1 and 3, we can now see that there is either over or


















which seems like a knife-edge case. This insight gives rise to the following theorem,
which takes up the classical case of no aggregate uncertainty about the fraction of
agents who are impatient. In this case there is a unique equilibrium, which is generi-
cally constrained ineffi cient (though we don’t say whether because of overinvestment
or because of underinvestment).
Theorem 4 Suppose there is no aggregate uncertainty, S = 1. Suppose u satisfies
DARA and is three times continuously differentiable. Then there is a unique
equilibrium. Fix arbitrary discounts 0 < β1 < ... < βI , productivity R > 0, and the
probabilities πis. Then for almost every choice of (w
1, ..., wI) ∈ RI++, the unique
competitive equilibrium is ex ante constrained ineffi cient.
Proof. By the assumption on u, qs (x) and consumptions cist (x) are twice contin-
uously differentiable functions of x ∈ (0, e). Hence we can define the continuously
differentiable function F : (0, e)× RI++ → R2 by





























[R(e− x)− cis2 (x)],
and w = (w1, ..., wI). Equilibrium occurs when F1(x,w) = 0 and constrained ineffi -
ciency when F2(x,w) 6= 0 also.
First we show that whenever F1(x,w) = 0, the derivative ∂F1(x,w)/∂x < 0. The
reason is that ∂qs(x)/∂x > 0 (by Proposition 2), and with no aggregate uncertainty,
1−Rqs(x) = 0. It follows that there must be a unique equilibrium, since any function
like F1(x|w) that always crosses the x-axis with negative slope can only cross once.
We now demonstrate that whenever the two dimensional function F (x,w) = 0,
the derivative matrix D(x,w)F has column rank 2. Note first that the most impatient
agent 1 must always be a seller of good 2, hence [R(e− x)− cis2 (x)] > 0 for all s. It
follows that ∂F2(x,w)/∂w1 > 0. Moreover, when 1 − Rqs(x) = 0 for all s (as must
happen when there is one future aggregate state), ∂F1(x,w)/∂w1 = 0. We already
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This rank argument shows that the two dimensional function F is transverse to 0,
F t 0, that is whenever F (x,w) = 0, the derivative matrix D(x,w)F has column rank
2. Then since the functions F are continuously differentiable, by the transversality
theorem, for almost all w ∈ RI++, we have Fw t 0, where Fw(x) ≡ F (x,w). But
DxFw(x) is a 2 × 1 matrix and thus can never have rank 2. Hence for almost all w,
Fw(x) is never 0, which means that whenever the top expression F1 is 0, the bottom
expression F2 is non-zero. It then follows that for almost all w, every equilibrium is
constrained ineffi cient.
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